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Evading the Treaty Power?:
The Constitutionality of Nonbinding Agreements 
Michael D. Ramsey*
The U.S. Constitution states that the President can make treaties with 
the advice and consent of the Senate, “provided two thirds of the Senators 
present concur.”1 This high threshold for consent reflects the framers’ 
concern that treaties not be too easy to make. It represented a radical 
departure from the British system most familiar to the framers—in which 
the monarch alone made treaties2—and an endorsement of the treaty-
making provisions of the Articles of Confederation, which required a 
supermajority of states to approve a treaty.3 In particular, the Constitution’s 
treaty-making clause appears to endorse the outcome of the failed Jay-
Gardoqui Treaty of 1785–86, which would have given up U.S. rights to 
navigation of the Mississippi River (crucial to states with western lands, 
such as Virginia) in return for concessions benefitting the Northern states, 
and which was blocked by a minority of states under the Articles.4
Indeed, during most of the Convention, the draft Constitution did not 
involve the President in treaty making at all, giving the power entirely to 
the Senate. Although the delegates added the President to the treaty-making 
process toward the end of the Convention, in large part as a check on the 
state-oriented Senate and as a practical necessity for unified negotiations, 
they did not see adding the President as superseding the Senate’s role in 
approval. Discussion on the Senate’s role focused chiefly on whether the 
threshold for approval should be higher (for added protection against 
unwise treaties) or lower in specific areas (such as peace treaties) where an 
*   Professor of Law and Director of International and Comparative Law Programs, University of 
San Diego Law School. Thanks to Jonathan Adler, Brannon Denning, Josh Blackman, Saikrishna 
Prakash, Lisa Ramsey, Michael Rappaport, and the participants in the Separation of Powers Symposium 
at Florida International University College of Law for helpful comments and conversations. 
1  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
2  1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 242–50 (1765). 
3  ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX, para. 6. 
4 See Charles Warren, The Mississippi River and the Treaty Clause of the Constitution, 2 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 271, 825–90 (1934); Jack N. Rakove, Solving a Constitutional Puzzle: The 
Treatymaking Clause as a Case Study, 1 PERSPECTIVES IN AMERICAN HISTORY (NEW SERIES) 233, 272–
74 (1984); Eli Merritt, Sectional Conflict and Secret Compromise: The Mississippi River Question and 
the United States Constitution, 35 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 117 (1991); Edward T. Swaine, Negotiating
Federalism: State Bargaining and the Dormant Treaty Power, 49 DUKE L.J. 1127, 1174–77 & nn.171–
74 (2000). 
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agreement might be especially valuable.5 Similar debates carried over into 
the ratification process, where the Constitution’s defenders emphasized the 
shared power and high threshold for treaty making, and opponents argued 
that there was not enough protection against bad treaties.6 No one said the 
President alone could make treaties; many emphasized the contrary. James 
Wilson, for example, declared that “[n]either the President nor the Senate, 
solely, can complete a treaty; they are checks upon each other, and are so 
balanced as to produce security to the people”;7 Hamilton made similar 
observations in The Federalist.8
In modern times, however, Presidents on their own authority have 
made international agreements that look much like treaties. 2015 provides 
two examples. First, the President negotiated an agreement with Iran, 
China, France, Germany, Russia, Britain, and the European Union 
regarding Iran’s nuclear development. Known as the Joint Comprehensive 
Plan of Action (JCPOA) and announced in July 2015, its principal goal was 
to limit Iran to non-military nuclear development in return for lifting U.S. 
and international economic sanctions on Iran.9 Second, the President joined 
with leaders of over 150 nations to produce the Paris Agreement on climate 
change, with a final version announced in December 2015.10 The 
Agreement attempted to promote and coordinate controls on carbon 
emissions in response to concerns over human-caused global warming. 
Both agreements appear to involve substantial commitments by the United 
States, but neither will require approval by the Senate (or Congress). 
5 See Rakove, supra note 4. 
6 E.g., Warren, supra note 4, at 297 (discussing importance of the issue in Virginia); Editor’s
Note: The Debate in the Virginia Convention on the Navigation of the Mississippi River, 12–13 June 
1788, in 10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 1493 (John P. 
Kaminski et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY]; Swaine, supra note 4, at 1175 & 
n.169.
7  2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 6, at 563 (Dec. 11, 1787). 
8  THE FEDERALIST NO. 66, at 402–03 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“The 
Senate, it is observed, is to have concurrent authority with the executive in the formation of treaties and 
in the appointment to offices . . .”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, at 420 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton 
Rossiter ed., 1961) (In respect to treaty making, “there is no comparison between the intended power of 
the President and the actual power of the British sovereign. The one can perform alone what the other 
can only do with the concurrence of a branch of the legislature.”); see also, e.g., 10 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 6, at 1391–92 (statement of Francis Corbin at Virginia ratifying convention) 
(“[The treaty power] is . . . given to the President and the Senate (who represent the states in their 
individual capacities) conjointly. . . . It steers with admirable dexterity between the two extremes,—
neither leaving it to the executive, as in most other governments, nor to the legislative, which would too 
much retard such negotiation.”). 
9  Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, July 14, 2015, https://assets.documentcloud.org/
documents/2165399/full-text-of-the-iran-nuclear-deal.pdf [hereinafter JCPOA]. 
10 See U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Adoption of Paris Agreement, Annex, 
https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/l09.pdf [hereinafter Paris Agreement] (setting forth text 
of agreement). 
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The President contends that these agreements are nonbinding under 
international law and so can be made on the President’s independent 
constitutional authority. This essay assesses that claim. It generally agrees 
with the President’s basic proposition but raises concerns about the 
application of that proposition to the Iran and Paris agreements. It 
concludes that without adequate safeguards these approaches can provide 
the President with substantial ability to evade the constitutional checks on 
the treaty-making power. Part I discusses “pure” nonbinding agreements 
such as the JCPOA, while Part II considers nonbinding commitments 
embedded within binding instruments, as illustrated by the Paris 
Agreement.11
I. NONBINDING AGREEMENTS
A.  Constitutional Considerations in General 
The word “treaty” in the Constitution indicates a binding agreement 
under international law. Vattel, the leading international law writer of the 
eighteenth century, wrote: “He who violates his treaties, violates at the 
same time the law of nations; for, he disregards the faith of treaties,—that 
11  The taxonomy is not entirely settled in this area. This essay uses the relevant terms as 
follows:
(1) A treaty is an agreement that is binding under international law and requires consent of two 
thirds of the Senate under U.S. domestic law.  
(2) A congressional-executive agreement is an agreement that is binding under international law 
and is made with either the advance authorization (ex ante) or the after-the-fact approval (ex post) of a 
majority of Congress.
(3) An executive agreement is an agreement that is binding in international law and made under the 
sole authority of the President without any approval by the Senate or Congress.  
(4) A non-binding agreement is, as the name indicates, an agreement that—unlike the other three 
types—is not binding in international law. In U.S. practice, nonbinding agreements are typically made 
by the President alone, although they may sometimes claim ex ante congressional approval as well. 
 The constitutional validity of congressional-executive agreements is disputed. See, e.g., MICHAEL
D. RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION’S TEXT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS 135–54, 197–217 (2007); Peter J. Spiro, 
Treaties, Executive Agreements, and Constitutional Method, 79 TEX. L. REV. 961 (2001); John C. Yoo, 
Laws as Treaties?: The Constitutionality of Congressional-Executive Agreements, 99 MICH. L. REV. 757 
(2001); Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in 
Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221 (1995); Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is
NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 799 (1995). The U.S. executive branch does not appear to 
claim congressional approval for the JCPOA or the Paris Agreement; the ensuing discussion thus does 
not consider the extent to which they might be argued to have congressional approval nor the extent to 
which congressional-executive agreements are a valid alternative to the Article II, Section 2 treaty. Cf.
David A. Wirth, The International and Domestic Law of Climate Change: A Binding International 
Agreement Without the Senate or Congress?, 39 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 515 (2015) (arguing that broad 
congressional legislation in the environmental area could be read to authorize binding international 
commitments on carbon emissions). 
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faith which the law of nations declares sacred.”12 Americans of the 
founding era were concerned that treaty violations would impugn the 
nation’s honor (an important consideration at the time) and more practically 
would give cause for war at a time when the United States was a weak 
nation militarily.13 In discussing the importance of treaties, members of the 
founding generation consistently referred to treaties’ binding nature.14 For 
constitutional purposes, therefore, an essential element of a treaty is that it 
is binding as a matter of international law. 
Nonbinding agreements are necessarily not treaties, because (by 
definition) they lack the essential characteristic of bindingness and therefore 
lack the corresponding implications for preserving honor and not giving 
offense.15 A nonbinding agreement is in effect a statement of policy (or 
rather multiple parallel statements of policy) which the relevant parties 
understand can be changed unilaterally in any party’s discretion. Because a 
nonbinding agreement is not a treaty and does not implicate the concerns of 
a binding commitment, the treaty-making clause is not relevant to its 
constitutional status. Put precisely, the treaty-making clause does not 
preclude the President from making nonbinding agreements. 
Of course, the President must point to an affirmative source of the 
power to make nonbinding agreements, and since the Constitution does not 
mention them expressly, that must be found in some other source of power. 
Two approaches are possible. First, one might say that the President can 
make nonbinding agreements in areas of express presidential power—most 
obviously, regarding military matters pursuant to the commander-in-chief 
power, and perhaps also in connection with recognizing foreign 
governments (a power said to be implied by the reception-of-ambassadors 
clause).
More broadly, the theory of executive foreign affairs power holds that 
the vesting of “executive Power” with the President in Article II, Section 1, 
includes foreign affairs powers not specifically granted to other entities by 
the Constitution.16 Under this approach, diplomacy and the management of 
foreign affairs are powers of the President, and those powers would likely 
12  EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS bk. II, sec. 221 (Bela Kapossy & Richard 
Whatmore eds., 2008) (1758). 
13 E.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, at 151 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
14 E.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 64, at 394 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
15 On the constitutionality of nonbinding agreements, see Duncan Hollis & Joshua J. Newcomer, 
“Political” Commitments and the Constitution, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 507, 563–66 (2009). On the 
diplomatic aspects of nonbinding agreements, see Kal Raustiala, Form and Substance in International 
Agreements, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 581 (2005). 
16  Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, 111 
YALE L.J. 231 (2001); RAMSEY, supra note 11, at 51–90. 
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include a general constitutional power to make nonbinding agreements.17
Nonbinding agreements also appear to have some analogues in the 
founding era. While it is not clear if formal nonbinding agreements existed 
in the founding era, in the post-ratification period Presidents made 
statements of nonbinding foreign policy. For example, in the Monroe 
Doctrine, the President announced a U.S. policy of opposing further 
colonization or re-colonization of the Western Hemisphere by European 
powers.18 Earlier, President Washington announced a policy of neutrality in 
the conflict between Britain and France in 1793.19 And if Presidents had 
these foreign policy-making powers, there seems no objection to Presidents 
formulating and announcing their policies in parallel with other nations, as 
in a nonbinding agreement.20
While the Constitution’s text and practice thus appear to allow 
Presidents to make nonbinding agreements, we should consider whether 
nonbinding agreements nonetheless threaten to erode the protections of the 
treaty-making clause. At least three constitutional limitations on nonbinding 
agreements, if appropriately understood and observed, should substantially 
ensure that they do not. 
(1) First, nonbinding agreements are not part of the “supreme Law of 
the Land” defined in the Constitution’s Article VI, and thus should have no 
domestic legal effect in U.S. courts nor impose any legal obligations on 
U.S. domestic entities. Treaties, of course, are included in the Article VI 
definition,21 but nonbinding agreements are necessarily not treaties. The 
framers included treaties in Article VI to assure compliance with binding
obligations.22 The exclusion of nonbinding agreements from Article VI 
makes sense because their nonbinding nature obviates concerns about 
violations. Thus if a President wants to make international commitments 
that require domestic legal implementation, the President must either make 
them in a binding treaty with legislative approval or seek a separate 
legislative implementation. 
17  One might also argue that nonbinding agreements have been approved by practice and 
congressional acquiescence even if not authorized by the original Constitution. They have been used by 
U.S. Presidents at least since the early twentieth century, see Hollis & Newcomer, supra note 15, at 
516–17, and although some particular agreements have been controversial, the general practice does not 
seem to have generated sustained objections. 
18 See 41 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 22–23 (1823) (statement of President Monroe announcing 
policy).
19 See Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 16, at 327–39. Of course, this proclamation was 
somewhat controversial at the time. 
20  Indeed, the Monroe Doctrine was formulated in cooperation with Britain and could have been 
stated as a nonbinding agreement. See JOHN SEXTON, THE MONROE DOCTRINE: EMPIRE AND NATION IN 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (2011).
21  U.S. CONST. art VI. 
22 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, supra note 13, at 150–51. 
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(2) Second, the President has a constitutional obligation to assure that 
a purportedly nonbinding agreement is clearly and unequivocally 
nonbinding under international law. Otherwise, there is risk that other 
parties to the agreement will regard it as binding—and perhaps that it will 
in fact become binding under international law. In either case, departing 
from it may carry the equivalent reputational and other sanctions associated 
with violating a binding treaty. The central point of the treaty-making 
clause is that the United States must not undertake this level of commitment 
without the Senate’s consent. As a result, an agreement that is only 
ambiguously nonbinding amounts to an evasion of the treaty-making 
clause.
(3) Third, a nonbinding agreement does not constrain future Presidents 
(even informally). It has no greater status than a unilateral statement of 
policy. Because it is essentially an open-ended statement of policy, a 
nonbinding agreement––like a policy statement––must be capable of being 
reversed at a later time by a new President (or indeed even by the same 
President, if that President decides the policy no longer serves U.S. 
interests). A President has no power to limit successors’ policymaking 
authority. Thus, a nonbinding agreement cannot be understood as imposing 
constraints on policymakers within the U.S. domestic legal or political 
system and it cannot be represented to foreign parties as imposing any 
constraints on U.S. policymakers in the international legal or political 
system.23
Observing these three limitations may be sufficient to assure that 
nonbinding agreements do not threaten an end run around the protections of 
the treaty-making clause. One further limitation is worth considering, 
however. It may be especially troubling if a purportedly nonbinding 
agreement makes a specific commitment on behalf of the United States 
which the current U.S. President cannot fulfill. This might arise if the 
President made a commitment to do something that could be done only by 
another branch of government (for example, declaring that certain legal 
activity would be prohibited or that certain illegal activity would be 
allowed). It might also arise if the President declared that the United States 
would take a specific action on a specific date in the future beyond the 
current President’s term. Consider, for example, a hypothetical agreement 
between the current President and Cuba, promising to return the 
Guantanamo naval base to Cuba on January 1, 2020. The current President 
(in 2016) has no ability to fulfill this promise and no ability to bind the 
23  Of course, other nations may alter their nonbinding policies in response to a U.S. shift in 
nonbinding policy. The practical dynamics may or may not roughly correspond to violations of binding 
agreements. See generally Raustiala, supra note 15 (discussing the role of binding and nonbinding 
agreements in international relations). 
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future President to it (or even to commit the future President to a policy in 
this regard). Even if the agreement is unequivocally nonbinding in other 
respects, the President’s commitment to a specific outcome in the distant 
(but specific) future might create expectations and reliance by the other 
party, and thus implicate the policies of the treaty-making clause.24
B.  A Constitutional Assessment of the JCPOA 
To illustrate these parameters, consider the JCPOA with Iran.25 The 
JCPOA was arguably the most significant international agreement 
concluded by the United States in 2015. By its terms, Iran agreed to 
specified limits on its nuclear development program purportedly assuring its 
non-military character for fifteen years. In return, the United States, the EU 
and the other permanent members of the U.N. Security Council (Britain, 
France, Russia, and China) agreed to lift a broad range of economic 
sanctions against Iran (specified in detail in the JCPOA), including those 
imposed unilaterally by the United States and those imposed through the 
U.N.26 Because some of the sanctions involved freezes of Iranian assets, 
implementation of the agreement allowed Iran access to substantial 
financial resources as well as future business opportunities. The parties also 
agreed not to re-impose sanctions so long as Iran followed the course of 
action outlined in the JCPOA.27
An essential aspect of the deal, from the U.S. constitutional 
perspective, was that the President had statutory authority to accomplish the 
actions promised in the JCPOA. The principal U.S. undertaking was to lift 
sanctions related to Iran’s nuclear program, including both unilateral U.S. 
24  Most nonbinding agreements do announce continuing actions that extend into the indefinite 
future. See Hollis & Newcomer, supra note 15, at 516–17 (giving examples of important nonbinding 
agreements). The difference emphasized here is where a specific action is promised at a specific date in 
the future. 
25  JCPOA, supra note 9. The JCPOA was highly controversial in Congress, which took 
ultimately unsuccessful action to block it. As the negotiations were proceeding, Congress passed the Iran 
Nuclear Review Act, which required the President to submit any agreement with Iran to Congress, 
delayed implementation of any agreement for sixty days so Congress could consider it, and provided 
Congress with an opportunity to vote its disapproval. Pub. L. No. 114–17, 129 Stat. 201 (2015). Once 
the agreement was concluded, the President submitted it to Congress as required, but Congress was 
unable to take action due to a filibuster by the Democratic minority in the Senate. The President then put 
the agreement into effect without Congress’ approval but also without its formal disapproval. See
Kristina Daugirdas & Julian Davis Mortenson, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to 
International Law, 109 AM. J. INT’L L. 873, 874–78 (2015). Various commentators, including some in 
Congress, argued that the JCPOA was an unconstitutional infringement of the treaty power. See, e.g.,
David Rivkin & Lee Casey, The Lawless Underpinnings of the Iran Nuclear Deal, WALL ST. J. (July 26, 
2015), www.wsj.com/articles/the-lawless-underpinnings-of-the-iran-nuclear-deal-1437949928. There was 
no judicial avenue for testing those claims. 
26  JCPOA, supra note 9, arts. 1–17 (Iran’s obligations); id. arts. 18–31 (U.S. and other nations’ 
obligations).
27 Id. art. 26. 
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sanctions and international sanctions imposed through the United Nations. 
The President undoubtedly had authority to take both actions. The U.S. 
sanctions statutes expressly gave the President authority to suspend 
sanctions.28 With respect to U.N. sanctions, the United States acts at the 
U.N. through its U.N. ambassador, who in turn acts at the direction of the 
President. Thus the President could use his statutory authority to lift 
unilateral sanctions and could use his constitutional diplomatic authority to 
direct the U.N. ambassador to vote in favor of lifting U.N. sanctions. 
Crucially, the JCPOA did nothing to alter the President’s authority in these 
regards; he could have taken both actions merely on the basis of an informal 
private understanding with Iran or even in the absence of any understanding 
with Iran at all. 
A more substantial concern is whether the JCPOA is unequivocally 
nonbinding. In many respects it has the character of a nonbinding 
agreement. First, its preface states that the parties “will take the following 
voluntary measures,”29 and all of the specific obligations are stated (like the 
introductory clause) as things the parties “will” do rather than things the 
parties “shall” do.30 Second, it did not employ the usual formalities of a 
binding agreement: it was apparently not signed by the parties’ 
representatives; it does not recite that the parties intended to be bound; it 
did not have procedures for ratification.31 Third, its title—“plan of action” 
rather than “accord” or “convention”—indicates a nonbinding arrangement. 
Fourth, at least in domestic communications, the U.S. State Department 
generally described it in terms consistent with a nonbinding rather than a 
binding commitment, although this was more clear after the agreement was 
concluded than before.32 In sum, it is plausible to view the JCPOA as 
describing ongoing reciprocal policies—that is, Iran plans to do “x” as long 
28  DIANNE E. RENNACK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43311, IRAN: U.S. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
AND THE AUTHORITY TO LIFT RESTRICTIONS (2014), https://news.usni.org/2014/12/30/document-
congressional-report-u-s-sanctions-iran; Marty Lederman, Congress Hasn’t Ceded Any Constitutional 
Authority with Respect to the Iran JCPOA, BALKINIZATION (Aug. 8, 2015), http://balkin.blog
spot.com/2015/08/congress-hasnt-ceded-any-constitutional.html.
29  JCPOA, supra note 9, preface. 
30 See id. arts. 1–34. As discussed infra in connection with the Paris Agreement, modern 
diplomatic practice generally understands “will” or “should” to indicate nonbinding obligations and 
“shall” to indicate binding obligations. 
31  It may be regarded as especially significant that Iran did not insist on a signed document or a 
recitation of that the parties intended to be bound, given that (as discussed below) doubts about the 
agreement’s ability to bind future Presidents were raised during the negotiations. 
32  Letter from Julia Frifield, Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, to 
Congressman Mike Pompeo (Nov. 19, 2015), http://pompeo.house.gov/uploadedfiles/151124_-_reply_
from_state_regarding_jcpoa.pdf (describing the agreement as “not a treaty or an executive agreement” 
and as reflecting “political commitments”); Transcript of U.S. Dep’t of State Daily Press Briefing, Mar. 
10, 2015, http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2015/03/20150310313990.html?CP.rss=tru
e#ixzz3U4WoiX7D (describing pending agreement as a “political commitment”). 
37901-fiu_11-2 Sheet No. 49 Side A      06/27/2016   12:34:37
37901-fiu_11-2 Sheet No. 49 Side A      06/27/2016   12:34:37
C M
Y K
06 - RAMSEY_FINAL 6.12.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/12/16 11:52 PM
2016] Evading the Treaty Power? 379 
as the United States is doing “y,” and vice versa—rather than describing 
legal obligations. 
Nonetheless, substantial doubts may remain. The JCPOA’s text in 
some respects suggests a binding commitment. It is very specific with 
respect to the sanctions relief the United States undertakes to provide and 
very specific as to the timetable (that is, it is much more than a vague 
statement of policy that sanctions will be lifted at some point in the 
future).33 It also has a detailed dispute resolution mechanism34—an unusual 
and perhaps unprecedented feature if the agreement is nonbinding. In 
addition, it is uncertain whether the U.S. negotiators made clear to the other 
parties that the agreement was nonbinding. Some statements by Iranian 
officials indicate the contrary.35
Relatedly, when members of the U.S. Senate publicly argued that the 
agreement would not bind future Presidents, the U.S. executive branch did 
not clearly endorse that position and in some respects seemed to undermine 
it. While the negotiations were proceeding, and after the President had 
made clear that he would not submit the agreement for the Senate’s 
approval, Republican Senator Tom Cotton posted on his website an open 
letter to the Iranian government from himself and forty-six other Senators, 
setting forth their view that an agreement not approved by the Senate would 
not be binding on future Presidents.36 The Iranian foreign minister 
reportedly responded with his understanding that the agreement would be 
binding under international law.37 Without directly addressing the letter’s 
substance, the U.S. executive branch strongly objected to the Senators’ 
letter as unconstitutionally interfering with the President’s diplomatic 
powers by purporting to communicate directly with Iran. While there may 
have been merit to the President’s constitutional argument as a procedural 
matter,38 the President should have recognized a constitutional obligation to 
33 See, e.g., JCPOA, supra note 9, art. 21 & Annex II (listing U.S. sanctions); id. art. 34 (setting 
forth specific schedule including “milestones”). 
34  JCPOA, supra note 9, arts. 36–37. 
35 See Jake Miller, Iran: GOP Letter on Nuclear Negotiations a “Propaganda Ploy”, CBS
NEWS (Mar. 9, 2015), www.cbsnews.com/news/iran-gop-letter-on-nuclear-negotiations-a-propaganda-
ploy (quoting Iran foreign minister’s comment that future departures from the agreement would be a 
“blatant violation of international law”). 
36  Senator Tom Cotton, et al., An Open Letter to the Leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran
(Mar. 9, 2015), www.cotton.senate.gov/sites/default/files/150309%20Cotton%20Open%20Letter%20
to%20Iranian%20Leaders.pdf (letter on behalf of himself and forty-six Republican Senators asserting 
that future presidents would not be bound by Obama Administration’s deal with Iran); see also Tom 
Cotton, Why We Wrote the Letter to Iran, USA TODAY (Mar. 10, 2015), www.usatoday.
com/story/opinion/2015/03/10/iran-nuclear-talks-letter-47-senators-sen-tom-cotton-editorials-debates/24
721971 (calling agreement “non-binding” if not approved by the Senate). 
37 See Miller, supra note 35. 
38 See Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 16, at 317–24 (discussing President Washington’s 
exclusive control over diplomatic communications). 
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confirm the letter’s essential point.39 A nonbinding agreement such as the 
JCPOA necessarily does not bind future Presidents, and full candor in the 
negations required that Iran be fully aware of this. 
Finally, the foregoing point is important because the JCPOA contains 
continuing commitments by the United States that extend beyond the 
current President’s term. In particular, the United States undertakes not to 
re-impose the sanctions lifted pursuant to the agreement for fifteen years, so 
long as Iran abides by its commitments.40 As noted, a dispute resolution 
process is established if there is doubt whether Iran is abiding by its 
commitments, so in effect the United States undertakes—for a term 
extending far into future Presidents’ terms—not to re-impose sanctions 
without a favorable outcome from the dispute resolution process. 
Whether this commitment is sufficiently specific in content and date to 
raise the concerns noted above may be debated. Arguably it can be 
understood simply as a statement of policy. Thus by the agreement, one 
might say, the current U.S. President agrees not to re-impose sanctions 
without approval of the dispute resolution process, and future U.S. 
Presidents are free to either adopt or reject that policy; Iran, in turn, merely 
has agreed to adopt the policy of complying with the parameters of the 
JCPOA so long as the U.S. does not re-impose sanctions (a policy that Iran 
can unilaterally abandon).41 Put this way, the JCPOA appears merely to 
represent parallel statements of policy subject to ongoing unilateral 
reevaluation. Under that description, the constitutional basis of the JCPOA 
seems secure. However, there are reasons to doubt that this is how all the 
parties understand JCPOA, including the agreement’s specificity as to 
future commitments and the U.S. negotiators’ failure (at least publicly) to 
clearly endorse the conclusions of the Cotton letter. 
In sum, the main potential constitutional problem with the JCPOA is 
that its nonbindingness is not entirely clear. Lack of clarity in its status 
39  As noted, the State Department subsequently confirmed in a letter to Congress that it viewed 
the agreement as nonbinding. See supra note 32. Although the Administration has not issued a formal 
explanation of the constitutional basis of the JCPOA, presumably it thought the JCPOA’s nonbinding 
character allowed the President to dispense with legislative approval. 
40  JCPOA, supra note 9, art. 26. 
41  Regarding U.S. obligations not to re-impose sanctions, Article 26 states: 
The U.S. Administration, acting consistent with the respective roles of the President and the 
Congress, will refrain from re-introducing or re-imposing the sanctions specified in Annex II that it 
has ceased applying under this JCPOA, without prejudice to the dispute resolution process 
provided for under this JCPOA. The U.S. Administration, acting consistent with the respective 
roles of the President and the Congress, will refrain from imposing new nuclear-related sanctions.
Id. The JCPOA goes on to state that if the United States does re-impose sanctions, “Iran has stated that it 
will treat such a re-introduction or re-imposition of the sanctions specified in Annex II, or such an 
imposition of new nuclear-related sanctions, as grounds to cease performing its commitments under this 
JCPOA in whole or in part.” Id.
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raises concerns that the President may be attempting an end run of the 
treaty-making clause by committing the United States to what other parties 
to the agreement may regard as binding promises. If the process were 
entirely clear—so that other parties knew exactly what they were getting 
and not getting—it would appear that the constitutional concerns would 
largely be resolved and the President’s ability to accomplish major 
commitments through nonbinding arrangements would be substantially 
constrained.42
II. NONBINDING PROVISIONS IN BINDING AGREEMENTS
A.  Constitutional Considerations in General 
The Paris Agreement43 creates a different set of constitutional 
concerns. Unlike the JCPOA, it (as discussed below) appears to be a 
binding agreement under international law. The President’s argument is not 
that the agreement as a whole is nonbinding; instead, it appears to be that 
the Agreement’s main provisions—relating to emissions targets—are 
nonbinding. Although some parts of the agreement are binding, those 
binding commitments are (it is said) immaterial, unimportant ones that the 
President can undertake on his own authority.44
As with the President’s power over purely nonbinding agreements, the 
basic constitutional principle underlying this claim seems to be correct. The 
Constitution acknowledges a difference between “treaties” and “other 
agreements” in Article I, Section 10, which says that states may not make 
treaties but that states may make agreements with the approval of 
Congress.45 Consistent with this distinction, Vattel and other eighteenth-
42  In contrast, another nonbinding deal reached in 2015 seems to avoid constitutional objections. 
In September 2015, the President announced an agreement with China regarding cybersecurity. See
Kristina Daugirdas & Julian Davis Mortenson, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to 
International Law, 109 AM. J. INT’L L. 873, 878–82 (2015). This agreement is evidently nonbinding on 
numerous grounds. It appears not to be in any written form and was announced in a “fact sheet” 
accompanying a news conference during President Obama’s visit to China. Id. at 878 & n.1. It is 
described as containing only commitments at high levels of generality for indefinite periods of time. Id.
at 878–79. And accompanying commentary indicates that the United States regards it as nonbinding, 
subject to China’s unilateral determination of its policy objectives, which may or may not comport with 
the agreement. See id. at 881–82. Under the perspective developed in this essay, the cybersecurity 
agreement appears constitutional; in contrast, under the view that all “agreements” of whatever nature 
must be approved by the Senate, the agreement could not be reached on the President’s sole authority. 
43 See Paris Agreement, supra note 10. 
44 See Daniel Bodansky, The Legal Character of the Paris Agreement, REV. OF EUR., COMP. &
INT’L ENVTL. L. (forthcoming 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2735252; see
also David A. Wirth, Cracking the American Climate Negotiators’ Hidden Code: United States Law and 
the Paris Agreement, 6 CLIMATE L. 152 (2016). 
45 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 (“No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or 
Confederation . . . .”); id. (“No state shall, “without the Consent of Congress . . . enter into any 
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century international law writers recognized a distinction between treaties 
and other agreements.46 These other agreements were also binding under 
international law, Vattel and others wrote,47 but they did not have the status 
of treaties because they involved short-term, one-time, or unimportant 
commitments.48
If the Constitution and eighteenth-century international law 
terminology recognized a category of binding international agreements that 
were not “treaties,” it should follow that (as with nonbinding agreements) 
the treaty-making clause has nothing to say about them; the clause concerns 
only the way to “make Treaties.” That is consistent with the framers’ 
concerns about having extra protection against unwise treaty entanglements; 
those concerns would be less weighty for short-term or minor agreements. 
And like nonbinding agreements, binding nontreaty agreements arguably 
fall within the President’s executive foreign affairs power.49
This conclusion is supported by post-ratification practice. Starting in 
1799, when the Adams Administration settled a claim against the 
Netherlands for wrongful seizure of a U.S. ship, the executive branch 
settled minor international claims and made other short-term commitments, 
without approval of the Senate or Congress, through binding international 
agreements.50 This practice continued and expanded through the nineteenth 
century without material constitutional objection.51 In the twentieth century, 
the vast expansion of U.S. diplomatic activity led to a huge increase in 
international agreements not approved through Article II, Section 2; these 
agreements have now become routine and dominate, at least numerically, 
the relatively small number of agreements approved as treaties.52
Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power . . . .”); see Abraham Weinfeld, 
What Did the Framers of the Federal Constitution Mean by “Agreements or Compacts”?, 3 U. CHI. L.
REV. 453, 454–56 (1936); Michael D. Ramsey, Executive Agreements and the (Non)Treaty Power, 77 
N.C. L. REV. 133 (1998). Article 6 of the Articles of Confederation had a similar distinction: states 
could not enter into “any conference, agreement, alliance, or treaty” with a foreign nation without 
Congress’ consent, and states could not enter into “any treaty confederation, or alliance” among 
themselves without Congress’ consent (thus apparently “agreements” among states were permitted). See
RAMSEY, supra note 11, at 180. 
46  VATTEL, supra note 12 bk. II, sec. 152–53; CHRISTIAN WOLFF, JUS GENTIUM METHODO
SCIENTIFICA PERTRACTATUM, sec. 464 (J.B. Scott ed., 1983) (1749) (“Nations and their rulers can enter 
into agreements which are distinguishable from treaties.”); see Ramsey, supra note 45, at 165–71 
(discussing these sources). 
47  VATTEL, supra note 12 bk. II, sec. 206; see also WOLFF, supra note 45, sec. 376; see
Ramsey, supra note 45, at 189–90 (discussing these sources). 
48 See Ramsey, supra note 45, at 197–99 (noting that the eighteenth-century international law 
sources are not fully clear or consistent in identifying the line between treaties and other agreements); 
Weinfeld, supra note 45, at 459–60 & n.30 (same). 
49 See supra nn.16–20; Ramsey, supra note 45, at 206–18. 
50  Ramsey, supra note 45, at 175. 
51 Id. at 175–83 (listing and describing agreements). 
52 See Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties’ End: The Past, Present, and Future of International 
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Thus executive agreements may seem on strong constitutional footing. 
Like nonbinding agreements, executive agreements may nonetheless 
threaten to infringe the treaty-making power if several key constitutional 
safeguards are not recognized. In particular: 
(1) Like nonbinding agreements, executive agreements should as a 
general matter not be part of the supreme law of the land.53 They are not 
included in Article VI’s definition of supreme law, and there are strong 
textual and structural reasons for thinking that omission was deliberate. If 
the framers distinguished between treaties and other international 
agreements (as Vattel’s account and Article I, Section 10 indicate), Article 
VI could easily have been written to make “treaties and other international 
agreements” part of supreme law. However, the framers emphasized that 
making treaties part of supreme law was not problematic because the 
Senate—a part of the legislative branch—participated in their approval. 
Since that is not true for other agreements—made by the President alone—
those agreements are rightfully not included as supreme law; to do so would 
make the President a lawmaker, in direct contravention of basic principles 
of separation of powers.54 Omitting executive agreements from supreme 
Lawmaking in the United States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236, 1257–60 (2008) (collecting 1980–2000 statistics). 
It is, however, somewhat difficult to assess which of these agreements are sole executive agreements 
and which are ex ante congressional-executive agreements (that is, agreements concluded by the 
President pursuant to an open-ended advance authorization by Congress); the executive branch does not 
state the authority for most agreements it concludes. See Oona A. Hathaway, Presidential Power over 
International Law: Restoring the Balance, 119 YALE L.J. 140, 155 (2009) (estimating that 
approximately twenty percent of agreements between 1990 and 2000 were sole executive agreements, 
with the remainder claiming some sort of congressional or treaty-based authorization). 
53  For an expanded argument, see Ramsey, supra note 45, at 218–35. 
54 See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 526–28 (2008) (discussing constitutional rule that 
President cannot make laws); Michael D. Ramsey, International Wrongs, State Laws and Presidential 
Policies, 32 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 19 (2010) (emphasizing this aspect of Medellin). The 
proposition that executive agreements should not be supreme law, although a seemingly straightforward 
reading of Article VI, is not fully consistent with the Supreme Court’s approach to executive 
agreements. See Bradford R. Clark, Domesticating Sole Executive Agreements, 93 VA. L. REV. 1573 
(2007) (describing and criticizing Supreme Court cases on executive agreements). The Court has 
approved executive agreements directly in four cases, and indirectly in several others. In the Belmont
and Pink cases, the Court in broad language approved a settlement agreement between the United States 
and the USSR in connection with U.S. recognition of the Soviet government. United States v. Belmont, 
301 U.S. 324 (1937); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942). The Court also found the agreement 
preempted state law, and the Court purported to see no difference between treaties and executive 
agreements for this purpose. In Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981), the Court approved an 
agreement between the United States and Iran resolving the 1979–1980 hostage crisis and establishing 
the U.S.-Iran Claims Tribunal to settle private claims; it again treated the agreement as part of domestic 
U.S. law without much explanation. Finally, in American Insurance Association v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 
396 (2003), the Court implicitly approved executive agreements between the United States and Germany 
and Austria relating to settlement of Holocaust-era insurance claims and found that the policy reflected 
in those agreements preempted state law. How broadly to read these cases remains disputed. Pink and 
Belmont did not indicate boundaries on the President’s power, although they arose in an area of specific 
presidential power (recognition). In Dames & Moore, the Court strongly emphasized both the claims 
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law assures that (as elsewhere) the legislature (or at least a part of it) retains 
authority over law making. 
(2) Sole executive agreements should have only a limited scope. While 
it may be difficult to establish a clear line between treaties and executive 
agreements, in general executive agreements should cover only minor or 
short-term undertakings. Otherwise, they would likely be called treaties in 
eighteenth-century terminology and so would be governed by the treaty-
making clause.55
In sum, the President can make binding international agreements that 
do not purport to change U.S. domestic law and entail only minor or short-
term agreements. It is a further step to say that the President can make 
binding agreements addressing important long-term matters, so long as the 
long-term commitments within the agreement are themselves nonbinding. It 
does not appear that there is any precedent for such arrangements in the 
post-ratification era. However, arguably it is a permissible combination of 
the President’s power to make nonbinding commitments on important 
matters and the President’s power to make binding commitments on 
unimportant matters. 
B.  A Constitutional Assessment of the Paris Agreement 
This section considers whether the 2015 Paris Agreement is 
constitutional under the approach described in the prior section. It 
tentatively concludes that it is not. 
To begin, it seems clear (though some have argued otherwise) that the 
agreement as a whole is binding under international law. It has all the forms 
of a binding agreement, including signature, ratification procedures, time 
for withdrawal, etc.56 Moreover, with respect to some of its obligations, it 
uses the phrase “shall,” which in modern international law is generally 
understood to indicate a binding obligation.57 In addition, it has not been 
settlement context (which, it noted, had a long history of presidential authority) and the fact that 
Congress had “acquiesced” in presidential claims settlement by not objecting and by passing facilitating 
legislation. Garamendi also arose in the settlement context but had no strong limiting language. Only a 
few years later, however, the Court in Medellin described Garamendi and Dames & Moore very 
narrowly as limited to settlement agreements. See Medellin, 552 U.S. at 531–32. 
55  Practice and precedent indicate that settlement agreements are uniquely a focus of executive 
agreements. Areas of particular presidential authority, such as military matters and recognition, 
potentially admit a broader scope to executive agreements. And congressional acquiescence in the use of 
executive agreements in particular areas may be an important factor under Dames & Moore. In sum, 
textual, historical and practical considerations suggest a fairly limited scope for executive agreements, 
although within that scope they may be, in modern practice, very numerous. 
56  Paris Agreement, supra note 10, art. 20 (signature and ratification), art. 21 (entry into force), 
arts. 22–23 (amendments), art. 24 (dispute resolution), art. 27 (reservations), art. 28 (withdrawal), art. 29 
(authentic texts). 
57 E.g., id. arts. 4.2, 4.3, 4.8. 4.13, 13.7 (prefaced by “shall”). See Bodansky, supra note 44, at 8 
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described as nonbinding by the United States or any other party.58 As a 
result, bypassing Senate consent cannot be justified on the ground that it is 
(like the JCPOA) a nonbinding agreement. 
However, it is also true that the Agreement’s most important 
commitments—those with respect to emissions targets—appear to be 
nonbinding. Here the agreement deliberately uses the word “should” rather 
than “shall”59—and it has been reported that the U.S. negotiators 
specifically demanded this phrasing to assure that the targets were 
nonbinding.60 Notably, however, this argument goes only to certain key 
provisions, but not to all provisions, of the agreement. Some provisions 
applicable to the United States retain the “shall” phrasing in the final draft. 
The existence of some nonbinding provisions within an otherwise binding 
instrument does not make the instrument as a whole nonbinding. Thus the 
President’s argument regarding the Paris Agreement is necessarily distinct 
from the argument defending the JCPOA. The Paris Agreement is arguably 
not a treaty, not because it is nonbinding but because it does not impose 
material binding obligations on the United States. In the terminology 
described above, it is an executive agreement (that is, a binding nontreaty 
agreement). 
It is not clear that this characterization solves the constitutional 
problem, however. That is so for two reasons. First, it is not clear that the 
Agreement’s specific binding provisions are sufficiently minor to justify the 
use of an executive agreement rather than a treaty. For example, Article 4.2 
states that “[e]ach Party shall prepare, communicate and maintain 
successive nationally determined contributions that it intends to achieve. 
Parties shall pursue domestic mitigation measures with the aim of achieving 
the objectives of such contributions.” Thus the United States must identify 
target emissions goals (“nationally determined contributions”) and must 
take some (unspecified) mitigation measures (even though the emissions 
goals themselves are nonbinding). If a future President or Congress decides 
the target goals process is not worthwhile, the process cannot be 
discontinued without violating a binding obligation (and the United States 
must remain a party to the Agreement for at least three years, per Article 
28).61
(discussing significance of verb choice); id. at 10–12 (describing articles imposing binding obligations). 
58 See Bodansky, supra note 44, at 15–17. 
59 E.g., Paris Agreement, supra note 10, art. 4.4 (emissions targets); see Bodansky, supra note 
44, at 11 (noting nonbinding provisions). 
60 See Marty Lederman, The Constitutionally Critical, Last-Minute Correction to the Paris 
Climate Change Accord, BALKINIZATION (Dec. 13, 2015), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2015/12/the-last-
minute-correction-to-paris.html (recounting how U.S. negotiators required the agreement to use the 
word “should” rather than “shall” to maintain its nonbinding character). 
61 In an important forthcoming assessment of the Paris Agreement, Professor Bodansky argues 
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Second, irrespective of the specific binding commitments, the 
agreement binds the United States to a general goal of reduced carbon 
emissions for an extended time, even though the implementation of that 
goal is left nonbinding. For the future, the United States is not committed to 
any specific level of emissions, but it is committed to the general policy of 
reducing emissions.62 Unlike truly nonbinding agreements, a future 
President cannot change that policy without violating international law.63 If 
a new President thinks global warming is overstated as a threat, or that 
that all of the binding aspects of the Agreement are within the President’s independent power because 
(a) they are “procedural”; (b) they repeat obligations undertaken in prior treaties approved by the Senate; 
or (c) they are consistent with existing U.S. law. Bodansky, supra note 44, at 18. None of these points 
seems to definitively establish the Agreement’s constitutionality, however. First, there is no authority 
that “procedural” obligations categorically can be undertaken by the President alone. Some procedures 
may be ongoing and burdensome, meeting the eighteenth-century definition of treaty. While a required 
procedure can often be implemented by the President on independent authority, this is a different 
proposition; the next President would also be bound to continue the procedure if it is incorporated into a 
binding intenational agreement, and this might be a substantial constraint on future U.S. policy. Second, 
consistency with existing U.S. law should not be a justification for unilateral presidential agreement 
making (and again there is no precedent that it is). If the agreement’s obligations are consistent with 
existing law, no legislative action is needed. However, embedding them in an international agreement 
fundamentally changes their character. Ordinary U.S. law can be repealed without an international law 
violation. Once the provisions become part of a binding international agreement, they cannot be repealed 
without violating international law (although as a matter of U.S. law, they can be repealed under the 
later-in-time rule). It is precisely the difference between ordinary legislation and international 
obligations that underlies the two-thirds requirement of the treaty-making clause. To say that something 
can be enacted as law by majority vote, and that it then can become an international obligation without 
further legislative approval, wholly subverts the limitations on treaty making. See Sean M. Flynn, 
ACTA’s Constitutional Problems: The Treaty Is Not a Treaty, 26 AM. U. L. REV. 903, 903–04 (2011) 
(discussing this argument in the context of the proposed Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement). As to 
the third ground, it seems plausible that a new treaty obligation that exactly tracks an existing Senate-
approved treaty obligation would not require Senate approval. The argument is not that the obligation is 
so immaterial to bring it within the President’s independent power; rather, it is that the Senate has 
already assented to the obligation. (It also may be true that undertaking a further obligation 
contemplated by a prior treaty is defensible on similar grounds: the Senate may give ex ante consent via 
a delegation.) It is possible that all of the binding obligations of the Paris Agreement fall within this 
category (the likely prior treaty is the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change), although that 
proposition is somewhat belied by the importance the parties seemed to attach to the Agreement. In any 
event, Professor Bodansky does not explain which of the binding commitments in the Paris Agreement, 
if any, precisely mirror (or are approved by) a prior treaty. 
62 E.g., Paris Agreement, supra note 10, art. 2 (setting forth goal of “[h]olding the increase in 
the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and . . . pursu[ing] efforts 
to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels.”); id. art. 4.1 (“Parties aim to reach 
global peaking of greenhouse gas emissions as soon as possible . . . .”). 
63  In contrast, assuming that Part I. B. supra is correct in concluding that the JCPOA is 
nonbinding, a future President could abandon the entire project of reaching an amicable arrangement 
with the current Iranian government without violating international law. To be clear, the Paris 
Agreement is constitutionally doubtful on this ground only if the commitments described here are new 
undertakings; as discussed, supra note 61, if they track undertakings in a prior Senate-approved treaty 
such as the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, they would arguably not require renewed 
Senate consent. See Bodansky, supra note 44, at 18; Daniel Bodansky, The United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change: A Commentary, 18 YALE J. INT’L L. 451 (1993). 
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emissions reductions will not materially mitigate the threat, the President is 
not free to articulate or act on that view. 
This seems to be a material commitment on the part of the United 
States. To be sure, the line between treaties and executive agreements is ill 
defined—and is probably not capable of precise definition given the 
ambiguity of the original sources. However, it is not clear that a 
commitment of this magnitude has previously been made as an executive 
agreement (rather than as a treaty, a congressional-executive agreement, or 
a nonbinding agreement) in the past. 
CONCLUSION
In sum, neither nonbinding agreements nor binding executive 
agreements pose a constitutional problem in theory. Because neither are 
“treaties” in the eighteenth-century meaning of that word, their use is not 
precluded by the treaty-making clause’s requirement of Senate 
supermajority consent to “make Treaties.” Moreover, the President’s 
executive power over foreign affairs and diplomacy likely provides a 
constitutional basis for taking such diplomatic actions so long as they are 
not precluded by other constitutional provisions. But in their modern 
versions, as reflected in the JCPOA and the Paris Agreement, the President 
is pushing them in directions that threaten to undermine the treaty-making 
clause by making their bindingness uncertain or taking on more substantial 
commitments. This aggressive approach threatens to evade the limitations 
on the President imposed by the treaty making power.
